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Five Notions of Haq: Exploring Vernacular 
Rights Cultures in Southern Asia1 
 
 
As India and Pakistan mark sixty years as postcolonial nations, an 
impressive feature of their uneven experiments with democracy is 
the confident and fluent employment of the language of rights to 
claim entitlements due to persons or groups from the State. While 
the lofty ideals of democracy, rights and citizenship have received 
intellectual support from South Asia’s elite, it is their poor, 
marginalized and dispossessed whose everyday struggles for 
rights that have protected and animated them. The dynamism of 
this grassroots activism, which articulates rights for multiple 
groups, identities and practices and citizenship claims for 
governance reform needs empirical investigation and a theoretical 
and historical elaboration. Despite the meteoric rise of social 
mobilisations in South Asia and in India in particular, there are no 
studies which have examined the language within which demands 
and entitlements are articulated or the philosophical assumptions 
underpinning the use of rights language in the region. And finally, 
there has been little attempt to pursue a comparative and 
integrative study of theoretical and empirical exercise of rights 
across the Southern Asian region. 
 
This working paper is a preliminary effort to document the various 
contemporary rights meanings in South Asia. It focuses on the 
etymological and vernacular history of the literal term used to 
denote a right in Southern Asia, which is the Arabic/Urdu literal 
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term ‘Haq’. In order to map contemporary meanings of Haq or 
rights in India and Pakistan, I put forward and examine five 
different justificatory premises upon which Haq is popularly 
predicted. By attending to the justificatory premises underpinning 
rights meanings, I investigate the ways in which rights are 
grounded in specific empirical contexts; address conceptual and 
empirical histories, political practices and contemporary politics of 
human rights in Southern Asia and think about political practices 
and political cultures outside the western world in a manner that 
avoids standard misdescriptions and misrepresentations of these. 
More specifically, through this paper, I wish to think about the 
relationship between our conceptual vocabularies and our  moral 
lives and in doing so, examine the ways in which language  
reinforces and contributes to the construction of  social hierarchies 
based upon asymmetrical relationships of power, exclusion, status 
and privilege. Thus, it is not only important to investigate the 
originary histories of the words but also to identify the sociological 
and political relationships that these words signify/uphold and are 
implicated in. And finally, in identifying the different justificatory 
premises of Haq, I hope to provide not only descriptions of 
citizenship articulations in non-western contexts but also 
conceptual articulations of its core referent: rights.   
 
A note of caution however, must be inserted here. Any research of 
this kind that aims to traverse cross cultural intellectual terrains is 
always in danger of falling prey to several kinds of intellectual 
danger. In respect of this particular research, there are at least four 
types of intellectual dangers: we need to be wary of not only 
orientalist representations of the non-western political subject, but 
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also equally wary of reverse orientalism or occidentalism2, of crude 
indigenisms or dangerous neo-nativisms which pay inadequate 
attention to the multiple sources which feed into the making of 
conceptual histories and of thinking about rights and citizenship as 
evolutionary and necessarily progressive by attending to the 
exclusions and ‘othering’ which takes place both through discourse 
and practice.  
 
In this paper, I shall first identify and outline the important 
questions central to the study of vernacular rights cultures. I 
proceed to provide a brief etymological and intellectual description 
of Haq which is the principal literal term within Urdu/Arabic to 
denote a right in Northern India and Pakistan. Finally, I isolate five 
different justificatory premises underpinning the employment of the 
word ‘Haq’ and thereby, rights usage in Southern Asia. 
 
The Study of Vernacular Rights Cultures 
It is now commonplace to argue that the last two hundred and fifty 
years have witnessed the ‘global diffusion of a culture of rights’ 
(Ignatieff 2001). While the causes of this spread are linked 
variously to the impact of western colonialism, immigration, 
international legal instruments and global communication, the 
assumption undergirding these arguments is an orientalist3 one:  
that the conceptual, philosophical and empirical experience of 
rights owe their formulation to the three revolutions of the modern 
west, to the English (1680), American revolution (1776) and the 
French revolution (1789). Not only are these emergent rights 
cultures seen as western derived but are regarded as symbolic of 
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this continuing western tradition of human rights. While the spread 
of modernity in different parts of the globe has coincided with the 
rise of rights based mobilisations, it is important to note that these 
rights articulations are expressed not through neologisms but 
within the vernacular and that they do not occur as singular or 
even odd prototypes but draw upon and are accommodated within 
existing vocabularies and norms governing entitlements, roles and 
identities. In fact, an important reason for the successful, 
meaningful and creative politics of rights in many parts of the non-
west can be traced to the presence of historical, linguistic and 
moral resources in these societies.   
 
Securing human rights has emerged among the biggest challenge 
of our times. Human rights are regarded as the epitome of western 
civilisational progress to which ‘other’ nations and peoples must 
aspire. On the other hand, there are powerful detractors of human 
rights who similarly place rights on a continuum of progress and 
linear historical time and prioritise economic development as a 
necessary precondition in the progress towards political and civil 
freedoms. Both these positions involve significant historical and 
intellectual forgetting. Not only are universal human rights a recent 
intellectual and political project within the global North but that 
discourses of rights and entitlements are powerfully invoked within 
vernacular political practice within the global South.  In recent 
years however, there has been a rise of sophisticated arguments 
which seek to advance the debate beyond these binaries and 
address questions of rights within the context of increasing 
economic global integration, ideational, communication flows and 
diasporic communities and within modernity, poverty and 
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development referring instead to ‘cosmopolitics’ (Cheah  and 
Robbins 1998), to  ‘global’ (Appiah 2004; Pogge 2002, 2007; 
Nussbaum 2000) and ‘vernacular cosmopolitanisms’ (Bhabha 
1999, 2002, 2008; Breckenridge et al 2002) with a view to 
establish transnational linkages between discursive practices at 
the global level with the struggles of the poor and the marginalized 
at the local level ( Mohanty 2003, Grewal and Kaplan 1994). Even 
as theoretical scholarship on vernacular cosmopolitanism and non-
western modernities is gaining recognition, there is little attempt to 
produce grounded or ethnographic accounts of the cultural idiom in 
which these vernacular cosmopolitanisms or indeed rights cultures 
are articulated, practiced and experienced.  While drawing upon 
many theoretical insights of vernacular cosmopolitanism, this 
paper instead focuses on an ethnographic, historical and 
contemporary articulation of vernacular rights cultures in Southern 
Asia and demonstrates how these expand the boundaries of 
ethical politics and practices from a subaltern perspective’. It uses 
the conceptual language of ‘vernacular rights cultures’ as it finds 
that the exercise of ethical political agency accompanying this 
demand for entitlements within this region is predominantly 
couched within religious, caste and regional terms. So, while this 
language of entitlement articulated in the pre-existing vernacular, 
arises out of the failure of democratic representative politics and 
state developmentalism, it does not preclude or diminish the 
inclusion of identity as a chief marker. Like freedom, rights are 
contextual and relational in nature (Brown 1995) and they require 
an empirical and theoretical study which captures the sociological, 
political, institutional and linguistic embeddedness.   
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As a conceptual intervention, the lens of vernacular rights cultures 
helps steer clear from the theoretical foreclosures and deadlock of 
mainstream discussions on rights in the non-western world. As an 
alternative to these explanations, it argues that vernacular rights 
cultures are not wholly derivative from the three major revolutions 
in the West- the American, the French and the English- or entirely 
oppositional to western notions and conventions of human rights or 
indeed, entirely discrete in form,  in that one would be hard 
pressed to find  hermetically sealed or ‘pure’ indigenous rights 
traditions but they are instead,  interlocked into relations that are 
historically productively, intimately, and coercively produced and 
experienced. In relation to South Asia, this research explores the 
different sites where formulation, translation and transposition of 
rights takes place and thereby is a key intervention in tracking not 
only the etymological histories of the literal language of rights 
outside of the western world, but also attending to the particular 
forms of conceptual development accompanying them as a result 
of the colonial encounter and anti colonial nationalism, the setting 
up of the postcolonial state and its distinct forms of 
developmentalism and bureaucratisation and more recently, 
through the impact of the increased ‘destatization’ and the 
proliferation of the non state organisations advocating ‘human 
rights’.  
A study of vernacular rights cultures  necessarily involve 
discussions of the nature and  kinds of modernity experienced 
within the non- west and the vernacular in which rights are 
articulated.  Along with attempts to show the historical and 
culturally specific character of these rights languages, it must track 
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the ways in which  emancipatory discourses of modernity have 
permeated the global south and intermingled with local idioms, 
investigate possibilities for emancipation together with new forms 
of subjection especially in relation to the state which come into 
being as a result of espousal of citizenship rights. It must 
demonstrate how the language of rights is conceived and the kinds 
of political, linguistic and normative strategies these rights 
mobilisations make in order to stretch and dislodge the existing 
normative boundaries of the universal (Butler 1997)   and through 
such efforts change the existing meaning and conceptual construct 
of rights itself and existing public policy. In addition to the advent of 
new subjectivities in Southern Asia this paper argues, the 
articulation of rights in the region has led to significant public policy 
legislation in support of citizenship rights particularly in the spheres 
of democratic accountability and transparency. A key intellectual 
challenge of research into vernacular rights cultures is to combine 
a critical interrogation of the emancipatory discourses and 
practices of modernity with its actual and grounded practices, 
projects and institutions and identify the possibilities for 
emancipation within the vernacular.  
 
In addition to providing a ‘grounded’ understanding of the 
contemporary articulation and practices of rights in South Asia, this 
paper hopes to offer an assessment of how rights operate 
politically and the political cultures they create including new forms 
of subjectivities and subjection. The uncovering and documenting 
of the literary and philosophical history of this ‘non-western’ rights 
language queries the intellectual, institutional and cultural 
foundations that sustain and preserve rights based ideas in the 
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region and involves detailed, ethnographically informed and 
theoretically sophisticated discussions on the nature of modernity 
experienced in Southern Asia. It aims to explore the relationship 
between conceptual vocabularies and morality and of the 
conceptual and political lives of ideas outside of their originary 
theoretical environs. In doing so, it examines the ways in which 
language reinforces and contributes to the construction of social 
hierarchies premised upon asymmetrical relationships of power, 
exclusion, status and privilege and identifies the sociological 
relationships that these words signify and are implicated in. It 
explores the ways in which this language of entitlement and rights 
is appropriated by subaltern groups operating within minoritarian 
positions and discourses and studies the ways in which persons 
who continue to suffer age old indignities and denial of rights 
consider the language of rights as useful political tools to claim 
recognition and redistribution from the State and other powerful 
groups within India and Pakistan. And finally, it examines how this 
intellectual history and contemporary experience of rights in South 
Asia inform not only our western derived formulations of human 
rights but also contribute towards thinking about non-western 
forms of rights.  
 
In referring to ‘vernacular rights cultures’, the reader will have 
recognised my intellectual debt to the proponents of ‘cosmopolitics’ 
and vernacular cosmopolitanisms. But I seek to maintain 
discernable differences in respect of them: A distance from the 
idea of cosmopolitics because of its strong faith in engendering 
mass global consciousness as not only do I not detect global 
consciousness in the rights mobilisations that form a part of this 
  9 
research but also, I remain unconvinced of the necessity of calling 
for a unified and a common global consciousness. Secondly,  while 
I‘m very sympathetic to cultural hybridisation as the site for 
resistance to both imperialism and neo-nativist including nationalist 
understandings of the postcolonial state, yet, I believe, the impact 
of the ‘material’ on this hybridisation might be understated in 
various writings on cultural hybridity. More seriously however, I feel 
that whereas hybridisation provides thick philosophical descriptions 
of the eurocentredness of the western cosmopolitical cultures 
which enter into contact with vernacular ones, these thick 
philosophical descriptions are not extended to the latter and we are 
left wondering about the philosophical nature of these vernacular 
cultures. So while hybridisation is a ‘strategic activity of authorising 
of agency’, could it be the case, that in failing to document full and 
thick descriptions of these vernacular cultures which are the actual 
sites for this cultural contact, Bhabha’s enunciation of cultural 
hybridity (1999), is according passivity and thereby denying 
agency to these vernacular cultures? In studying vernacular rights 
cultures, I am interested in the contact between Eurocentric 
cosmopolitan cultures of international human rights and vernacular 
rights cultures resulting in the new meanings and understandings 
of human rights to emerge.  But this contact is not, I suggest, 
between two mutually incomprehensible cultures or that it consists 
of the agentic cosmopolitical culture actively working upon the 
passive vernacular one without the latter talking back to it. Instead 
what I seem to increasingly find is that not only do vernacular 
rights cultures contain various sites of contestation and conflict 
which are intensely productive and make for dynamic practices of 
ethical reflection - forging interesting conceptual connections 
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including conceptual hybrids4-  but   also  that these produce and 
craft a certain kind of rights politics. This rights politics is 
articulated in the vernacular and seeks to particularise rights but 
quite paradoxically justifies this rights particularism in a language 
of normative universalism.  
 
The active particularisation of universal rights discourse is 
understandable given that the rights language employed by 
various social mobilisations in this study are movements for social 
justice which have clearly originated and are a response to 
particular indignities, injustices and inequities.  But it would be a 
mistake, to characterise these as   ‘local’ or simply as symptomatic 
and reactive to local needs and thereby ‘free floating’ and 
autonomous. On the contrary, these citizenship mobilisations are 
connected to and are part of a larger ‘global field’ of rights and 
transnational rights activism.  For instance, the right to food 
movement which advocates freedom from hunger as a 
fundamental right in India is a nationally based movement- one 
who’s demands are  not only recognised as a fundamental aspect 
of the right to life under India’s constitution but are also enshrined 
under international declaration of human rights5. 
 
Consider also, for instance, the movement for land rights in 
Pakistan led by the Anjaman Mazarein which earned a lot of 
publicity in international NGO circles and who at one stage in its 
mobilisation history evolved close dialogical and funding links with 
the international NGO ‘Action Aid’. Despite the transnational 
character of these movements, it is not altogether illegitimate to 
query the role of the nation- state in relation to these movements?  
  11 
Two things can be said with certainty in this regard: Firstly, many 
of these citizenship mobilisations are transnational but seldom are 
they postnational6.  In other words, many of these movements do 
not challenge the ‘cultural hegemony’ of the state but instead use 
the language of citizenship and court the state for redressal of 
popularly perceived wrongs, demand inclusion within existing 
constitutional/institutional structures and seek additions to already 
existing guarantees enshrined within state constitutions and in 
doing so, in many instances, suggest expansions to the list of   
formally recognised rights.  Secondly, even though the rights 
demands are directed at the state in the first instance, the social 
citizenship powers of the state are themselves severely curtailed 
by the impact and activities of transnational forces such as the 
World Bank, IMF and the other economic forces associated with 
neo-liberal globalisation.  
  
Although neoliberalism is often referred to in the singular it is 
experienced in the plural. The heterogeneity of neo-liberalism is 
now cogently argued and empirically documented in the various 
‘grounded’ studies of neo-liberal led globalisation (Rofel 2007; 
Rankin and Shakya 2008; Burawoy et al 2000; Barrientos and 
Perrons 1999; Ong 1999, 2007). Along with its experiential 
heterogeneity, scholars have also pointed to the fact that neo-
liberalism is often invoked as a predominantly economic doctrine7 
and its politically prescriptive project, its ‘political rationality’ or 
neoliberal governmentality’ is often ignored. This neoliberal 
governmentality, scholars suggest, produces certain ‘prudent’ 
subjects and subjectivities in its wake who perform roles essential 
to maintaining support and desire for many of its economic goals. It 
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is in the production of these ‘desiring’ subjects (Rofel 2007) that 
neo-liberalism legitimises itself and it is through its political 
rationality that neo-liberalism produces subjects, citizens and new 
ways of organising sociality so that they reflect its economic 
rationality efficiently. While neoliberalism’s political project is 
indispensable to its global reach, my empirical research into the 
citizenship mobilisation finds that its hegemonic reach may be 
limited to mainstream consumerist classes in South Asia. The 
challenge to neo-liberal governmentality is launched from the rural 
margins of Southern Asia and it is some of these challenges which 
are documented in this paper.  
 
The Word For a Right: The Etymology and Meanings of Haq in 
the Vernacular 
 
A principal question in the study of the evolution of rights language 
involves the examination of the relationship between the 
conceptual understanding of rights and the literal terms in the 
vernacular used to evoke rights. The incongruous relationship 
between words and concepts has been under considerable 
philosophical scrutiny and arguably, an asymmetrical correlation 
between the word and the concept is not peculiar to the literal and 
conceptual meanings of rights alone. However, in the context of 
southern Asia, the relationship between the literary meaning and 
the conceptual meanings of rights gains significance in the light of 
the fact that the literary term for ‘having a right’ or Haq is not only 
intellectually antecedent to its more ‘modern’ meaning but has its 
own conceptual history. 
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The literal term Haq is remarkably cosmopolitan and has an 
interesting intellectual history. As the principal Arabic word used to 
denote a ‘right’, it enjoys an intellectual recognition across the 
Arabic-speaking peoples in the Middle East and North Africa and 
among several communities in South Asia. In Southern Asia, the 
literal term Haq is uniquely placed as a case study to examine the 
historical and the modern meaning of rights as it easily transcends 
geographical and religious boundaries and is used to invoke a 
‘right’ by different religious and linguistic communities in Northern 
India as well as in Pakistan. The term Haq is a pre- Islamic Arabic 
word, which is also available in Hebrew, Persian and in some of 
the older Semitic languages. 
 
The Urdu language from which Haq is derived is spoken by only 
2.17percent of the population in Rajasthan. It is quite remarkable 
that this word has somehow been associated with rights by 
speakers of both Hindi and Urdu in Rajasthan.8 The word Haq has 
an interesting intellectual history. Haq is a derivative of the 
classical Hebrew term hkk whose use is by now ‘obscure’. Its 
meaning is ‘recovered by reference to the corresponding word in 
Hebrew’ where it means to ‘to cut in’, to inscribe’ and thereby 
refers to a permanent law or statute which necessarily does not 
have a particular normative content. Its earliest use in Arabic9 can 
be traced to pre Islamic poetry where it means ‘something right, 
true, just, and real’. In the Qur’an, its fundamental meaning is 
‘established fact’, and therefore ‘reality’, ‘justice and that which is 
true’. These meanings develop to include the divine and spiritual 
reality (Schacht, Menage and Pellat 1960). 
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Haq or hukk appears in the Hindustani/Urdu language through the 
influence of Persian in the Indian subcontinent. Its meaning within 
the earliest Hindustani dictionary is similar to its Qur’anic meaning, 
which is justice and truth. Like the Qur’anic meaning it does not 
explicitly apply to persons. The dictionary meaning of Haq has 
changed from a religious one to one that is partially secular and 
applicable to the individual. The change in the dictionary meaning 
is applicable only to the lexicographic exercises in colonial India. 
For today, even in the modern dictionaries of Arabic, Persian and 
Semitic languages, the Islamic meaning of Haq dominates. Haq in 
these dictionaries for example, denotes the following meanings: to 
be just, right, obligatory, make or decide to be just (Mashkur 1978). 
For example, in the earliest dictionary of the Hindustani language 
compiled by John Gilchrist (1790), Haq, the plural of which is 
hoqooq, is translated as ‘right’ and ‘due’. In the later editions of the 
dictionary, there is an addition to his meaning of Haq as ‘due’. This 
new addition to the existing meaning is ‘equity’. Haq now becomes 
clearly designated as a right in the modern sense and is now 
applicable to persons as a claim they can make. This meaning of 
Haq as a right becomes entrenched in the successive dictionaries. 
For instance, in the 1873 dictionary compiled by John Ferguson, 
hukk is denoted as: equity, reason and  due. Ferguson gives an 
example of this usage of Hukk in the following sentence: “Burra 
saheb subb quoy ko hukk insaaf kurrta”, (the governor does justice 
and equity to everybody). In 1884, John Platts assigned the 
following meanings to Haq in his Dictionary of Urdu classical Hindi 
and English where Haq means just, proper, right, true, correct, 
rectitude, equity, right title, privilege, claim, due, lot, portion, the 
Truth, true God. 
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There is another word used to stand for the idea of rights which 
appears in the dictionaries of the early 19th century: adhikaar. It is 
applicable to persons and is used to define/describe their social 
status in relation to others. In his Dictionary of Hindustani and 
English, John Shakespear (1820) includes the word adhikaar and 
excludes Haq. The meaning of adhikaar ascribed in the dictionary 
is: possessor of a right, title or privilege and an adhikaari is the 
bearing of royal insignia, dominion, possession and right. The later 
meanings of Haq share some similar meanings with adhikaar, for 
example, both include title and privilege in their meanings 
repertoire. There is however a notable difference in the meaning of 
adhikaar, it does not develop to include equity.  
 
It would be fair to suggest that these changed/additional meanings 
of Haq from a religious idea of a permanent law, right and real to 
include equity, claim and privilege in the 19th century were 
influenced by the enlightenment ideas dominant in Europe during 
that period. There are three reasons to support this claim: 
Firstly, this was the time that ideas of individual rights and justice 
were in ascendance in Europe and the lexicographers of the early 
Hindustani and Urdu dictionaries were European civil servants and 
missionaries who must have come in contact with these ideas. 
Secondly, the pre 18th century meaning of Haq was a religious one 
and did not apply to individuals in the same way as a ‘bearer of 
rights’. Finally, while the word Haq existed in the moral and 
religious vocabularies of that period, a fact confirmed both in its 
occurrence in the Qur’an and by its inclusion in the dictionaries of 
the period, the meanings that were prescribed to Haq in the most 
likely of cases did not correspond to the local meanings and 
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certainly not to its Qur’anic usage. Leaping two centuries and to 
the social world of the women who feature in this paper, this still 
holds true. For instance, they do not deny encountering the word 
Haq before, but they did not necessarily connect it with notions of 
universal equity, justice or individuation.  
 
To conclude this section, what I am saying here is essentially that 
no neologisms were created in order to accommodate this new 
meaning of rights that my fieldwork respondents had come in 
contact with as a result of their participation within various social 
mobilisations. In its earlier avataar, the word Haq did not exist to 
denote an ‘entitlement’ but was more expansive in meaning and 
close to an abstract notion of justice as what ‘is due’, rather than 
any formal or substantive notion of equality. The gender of Haq is 
overwhelmingly described as male and women admitted to never 
even using the term. And finally, there is a difference between the 
use of Haq an adhikaar within everyday speech practice.  
Adhikaar, often regarded as a ‘new’ addition to the vocabulary10, 
invites legalistic interpretation and is often used interchangeably 
with power or office, whereas Haq is regarded as something ‘that 
belongs to one’ and which must be ‘snatched back’ if taken.  
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Rights in Context:  Development, Citizenship and Rights in 
India and Pakistan 
 
Despite the long intellectual and literary history of Haq within the 
vernacular, it is fair to say that individual rights do not regulate 
interpersonal relations in social life either in North India or 
Pakistan. However, it is also the case that the discourse of rights 
has been successfully and innovatively employed by various 
grassroots citizens’ movements, in rural India and in recent years 
in urban areas within Pakistan to claim social, political and 
economic entitlements and liberties from the State. This paper is a 
preliminary effort to document this ‘innovative’ practice of rights 
and citizenship and is based on detailed ethnographic research in 
India and Pakistan between 1998-2008. In India, the fieldwork  
focused on the North-Western Indian state of Rajasthan11 and 
recorded narratives of development workers, grassroots political 
workers and participants of various citizen movements demanding 
rights to food, employment and public information,  and rights of 
dalits (those belonging to the formerly untouchable castes) and 
indigenous peoples. While the spectrum of rights covered by these 
movements is quite broad, these rights tend to be interconnected: 
for example, demanding the right to information about public work 
programmes of health, education or drought relief can in many 
cases involve a simultaneous claim for gender and caste equality 
whilst in the same breath drawing attention to corruption within the 
local and state bureaucracies, the judicial system and to the 
flouting of procedural norms within the administrative, executive 
and legislative system  itself.12  
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India’s development profile continues to be very mixed, despite its 
recent economic growth: the Human Development Index (HDI) for 
India in 2005 was 0.619, which gives the country a rank of 128th 
out of 177 countries.  According to official estimates, 31 percent of 
India’s population lives under the poverty line, 39 percent of 
Indians are illiterate, 14 percent of the population does not have 
good drinking water, and 47 percent of Indian children are 
underweight for their age. These statistics reveal that “Out of the 
156 countries with both HDI and GDI values, 137 countries have a 
better ratio than India's”13.  In terms of Millennium Development 
Goals, Rajasthan, which is the site of the field work study, is 
among the poorer states in India, which host 76 percent of the poor 
of India.14 The sex ratio for the state is 922:1000, which reflects the 
poor social status of women. Despite the improvements recorded 
since 1961 and Rajasthan continues to have a lower sex ratio than 
that of India, although the gap between the two has reduced over 
the years15. In Rajasthan, 31 percent of 6-14 years old girls do not 
go to school and 9673 women died in child birth in 1999 alone.16  
 
But despite its dismal social indicators, Rajasthan is at the forefront 
of many rights based mobilisations. These citizen movements, 
although based in Rajasthan,  have had a spectacular impact on 
national policy resulting in the formulation of several national and 
internationally recognised innovations to public policy which 
include  legislative passage of the ‘Right To Information Act India  
2005’17 , ‘The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act’ 2006 
and ‘The Mid-day Meal Scheme’ in 2002 which laid down the 
mandatory provision of a cooked meal to all children attending 
government aided schools across the country.  In 1997, 
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responding to a Public Interest Litigation filed at India’s Supreme 
Court by Vishakha a NGO based in the state capital of Rajasthan 
Jaipur, legal guidelines were framed to prevent sexual harassment 
of women in the work place. 18 
 
The reasons for Rajasthan’s pre-eminent position in matters of 
citizenship struggles are not altogether clear. Going by cold 
statistical print alone, its social and economic indicators are 
nowhere near satisfactory. Despite the plurality of social contexts 
inside rural Rajasthan there are some social practices, 
experiences and conditions which are common and widespread. 
Statistical patterns reveal only what one witnesses in the hamlets 
and the villages around the state: that girls are very seldom in 
secondary education let alone in primary schools, that iniquitous 
caste practices still determine interpersonal social relations, 
access to public amenities is strictly regulated according to one’s 
position in the caste hierarchy, child marriages abound and are 
celebrated in annual religious festivals, female infanticide is 
widespread amongst several communities resulting in a skewed 
sex ratio in the state and then there is the acute and  widespread 
poverty which has resulted in its constituent membership of the 
BIMARU state quartet19. But here comes the paradox: the state 
boasts of high female visibility in the public sphere, has high voting 
rates for women, a high proportion of SC/ST women contest and 
are elected to local government bodies and a vibrant women’s 
movement. 20  
 
Pakistan’s social development indicators are not remarkably 
dissimilar to those documented for India. According to the Human 
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Development Report 2006, the HDI for Pakistan was 0.539 which 
gave Pakistan the rank of 134th out of 177 countries. Pakistan 
ranks almost at the bottom of the GEM index and the country does 
not look on track to achieving the MDG 3. Throughout the 1990s, 
Pakistan’s GDP grew at less than 4percent per annum and its 
poverty actually increased to 32percent during this period, the debt 
servicing burden of the state increased from 19.6 in 1980 to 60.3 in 
2000.21  Unlike India, however, Pakistan does not often command 
global attention for the vibrancy of its citizen movements- but the 
eight year long movement by the peasant farmers of the Punjab for 
land and tenancy rights by the Anjaman Mazarein Punjab has 
been spectacular in not only attracting international  attention to 
the movement but also in capturing  and captivating popular 
imagination within Pakistan itself- But more significantly of all, 
perhaps, this peasant/agrarian movement  is now seen as 
symbolising the capacity of ordinary Pakistanis to mount a 
‘resistance to the post-colonial state dominated by the army’ ( 
Akhtar 2006).  
 
The Anjaman Mazarein movement is interesting case of not only 
peasant politics (Akhtar 2006) and a microcosm of community 
relations in Pakistan- many of its prominent members and 
supporters are Christian while the majority of peasant members 
and formal leadership is Sunni Muslim. Furthermore, this 
movement also witnessed a very large mobilisation by women 
peasant workers, but despite their participation in large numbers 
the movement has failed to raise any demands towards gender 
equality legislations or ignite a collaborative relationship between 
peasant women in rural Pakistan and urban women activists 
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campaigning for women’s rights in the Pakistani cities of Lahore 
and Karachi. In sum, however, the mass participation of women 
peasants in this agitation has had negligible impact upon existing 
women’s activism in Pakistan as a whole and been unable to 
galvanise public policy in favour of broadening women’s rights, 
particularly economic rights. Despite these serious shortcomings, 
the movement has been impressive for raising the profile of 
ordinary peasant farmers in Pakistan, who have thus far remained 
under the yoke of feudal farm practices, for articulating the 
language of rights within a rural context and finally for mobilising 
on the question of rights itself. While this movement has generated 
some interest in the print media in India and Pakistan, there are 
only few detailed scholarly pieces of research and to my 
knowledge no ethnographic studies of this rights mobilisation exist. 
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The fieldwork in Pakistan documented the employment of the 
rights language by the peasant farmers of the Anjaman Mazarein 
in two field sites: At the Military Farms, Okara and in Khanewal - 
both in the Punjab province. These field sites comprise large areas 
of agricultural land which are ‘owned’ by the Military and 
administered by them. The management by the Military including 
the terms of agricultural contracts of the peasant farmers attached 
to these lands dates to the colonial state administration. In recent 
years, the Military has sought to introduce changes to the original 
terms of the contract which can only be described as unfavourable.   
In 2000, the peasants who work on these farm lands organised 
themselves as the ‘Anjaman Mazarein’ in 2000 with an explicit 
intention of challenging the new terms of the contract and, as a 
consequence, the Pakistani Military.  
 
There is a long history to the discontent of the peasantry at Okara 
and Khanewal. The historical antecedents of the peasant 
discontent at   Okara and Khanewal can be traced directly to the 
vast population transfers that were undertaken by the British 
Colonial State in order to populate its vast irrigation projects 
particularly in the Punjab.  From 1885 onwards, nine population 
resettlement projects were set up at the sites of canal irrigated 
projects along the five rivers which drained the province of Punjab 
in undivided colonial India. Through transferring whole 
communities of people from across India to these irrigated 
agricultural sites, the colonial state aimed both to  create an 
independent class of proprietary peasants as well as to transfer 
ownership rights to its loyal subjects, particularly those who had 
supported the British during the first ever organised revolt to British 
  23 
rule in 1857. Therefore, the state had successfully produced within 
a short span of time, what Akhtar (2006:486) has termed  a 
‘hydraulic society’ in Central Punjab; one that could and would help 
maintain its economic and political legitimacy.  
 
The ‘transferred’ populations to the irrigated land settlements in the 
Punjab were given an undertaking by the colonial state that they 
would be given inalienable property rights to the land after a period 
of 10-15 years but that in the interim, they would have usufruct 
rights only and would cultivate the land as sharecroppers. 
However, this promise was never upheld22.  The failure to make 
good the initial promise of land ownership to the peasant 
sharecroppers was not reversed by the postcolonial Pakistani state 
and held in status quo by its Military apparatus who were given the 
charge of administering these irrigation settlement projects/Military 
farms.  In the first half of 2000,  the Pakistani Military challenged 
the basis of this peasant sharecropping arrangement concluded 
over a century ago, particularly in matters regulating the share of 
the agricultural produce and occupancy rights and sought to 
change these in order to extricate maximum financial largesse23. 
The Pakistani Military announced changes to the peasant 
sharecropping contract thereby requiring cash rentals to be paid 
instead of the previous batai or sharecropping principle based on a 
proportional division of crop yields. The peasants fearing economic 
destitution and eviction from the farm land organised themselves 
into the Anjman Mazarein and registered their protest.  
 
The peasant movement thus came into being on 7 October 2000, 
when five thousand peasant farmers organised a peaceful protest 
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against the new tenancy laws proposed by the Military. Two days 
later, armed police along with the Frontier Constabulary entered 
the village and started a campaign of violence against the village 
sharecroppers. Thus began four years of intimidation and siege of 
the Okara farms by the Military leading to arbitrary imprisonments 
without trial, intimidations, beatings and fatalities.  
 
In the course of the agitation and in aftermath, various legal 
challenges were mounted by the Anjaman Mazarin against the 
Military in Pakistani courts which, in turn, placed the legality of the 
Military ownership of  the farm lands under close scrutiny. The 
court proceedings established that the Pakistani Military was in 
fact, not in any legal position to introduce changes to the peasant 
contract and even less able to establish through documentary 
evidence, its proprietary status as the landowner 24.  In other 
words, the very claim of ownership of these lands by the Military 
had became a legitimate legal and political question. The dispute 
over the Military farms in Khanewal and Okara posed an 
unambiguous challenge to the legitimacy of the Military to 
administer these lands in the first place and the state has now 
been left  to enforce its writ over these lands,  although, it is clear 
that the writ itself has no legal bearing. The tenants of Okara and 
Khanewal farms have emerged as the winners in this conflict with 
the Military- Pakistan’s most powerful institution- in that they have 
not surrendered any share of their crop yields to the Military in the 
first six years of the movement, they have continued to retain 
control over the land and have not suffered economic insecurity 
that would have befallen had they accepted the new tenancy laws.  
The Anjaman Mazarein used the language of rights to press ahead 
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with their challenge to the Military, but what kinds of 
understandings underpin this usage of rights?  
 
In order to uncover the various meanings that underpin Haq, I now 
turn to exploring the different justificatory premises of Haq 
idenitified during the course of my field studies in India and 
Pakistan.  
 
Five Justificatory Premises of Haq 
The justificatory premise of rights within western canonical 
philosophy and its contemporary theoretical articulations resides 
principally in the autonomy of persons, in their capacities for self 
governance. In the 20th century, the two most influential texts on 
rights25  regarded rights to be liberties, immunities, claims and 
powers to be exercised in relation to others and designated rights 
as crucial for dignity and self respect. It is the association of rights 
with conflict, with bounded selfhood, of individuals requiring 
protection from encroachments on their autonomy and integrity by 
other persons have made certain sections of feminist philosophical 
thinking deeply sceptical of rights (Kiss 1997). The different 
justificatory premises of Haq do not defend rights upon securing 
the autonomy of the self governing individual but they present an 
intellectual defence of rights in a language that is state 
dependent/legal, is in defence of citizen’s duty to participate 
politically, or in other words, rights are used to defend the political 
rights of citizens. Citizenship rights26 are predominantly invoked in 
relation to ‘political status’ and ‘national status’ i.e. invoked in 
relationships of individuals to the state, particularly in respect to 
rights and entitlements, and sometimes in relationships of 
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individuals with other individuals. The ethnographic accounts of 
Haq however show that both aspects are critical to thinking about 
citizenship for not only does the actual success but also the voicing 
of claims against the state are dependent on the reconfiguration of 
relationships not only between the state and individuals and 
groups but also between individuals and groups within the 
national/local political community.  But renegotiating relationships 
on the basis of rights involve intense conflict, transgressive politics 
and injury; much of my ethnographic evidence confirms this. 
Furthermore, rights are also defended in moral/normative terms, as 
ancestral claims and finally rights are justified in religious/Islamic 
terms.  
 
Rights As Marking Citizenship and  as Justifying Political 
Participation 
 
By far the most ubiquitous justificatory rights premise was 
articulated in terms of citizenship entitlements. I found two 
dominant ideas associated with citizenship being articulated by my 
interviewees: the first a legalist notion of citizenship which 
predicated rights upon law and the constitution and the other a 
more ‘active’ view of citizenship which regarded rights as crucial 
for political participation, an activity considered important for 
exercising citizenship27.  
 
For instance, consider the following excerpted interviews which 
express the two notions of citizenship:  The first interview cited 
here is with Prem Bairwa, a dalit woman member of the village 
council in her village of Kotkhawada, Jaipur district. In addition to 
her role as a member of the local village council, Prem Bairwa is 
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affiliated to a well funded NGO, Cecoedecon noted by many to be 
one of the largest recipients of foreign funds28 which although 
based in Jaipur has organised activities in different districts in 
Rajasthan. She is also closely associated with the National 
Campaign for Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR), a national level 
advocacy organisation in India championing the cause of dalit 
human rights.  
 
According to her: 
 
‘As a council member, I have a Haq in the panchayat (village 
council) to get development done in the village. Do only men 
have the right to speak and conduct political business; are not 
women to enjoy these rights equally?  It is a fight for my Haq 
and a fight I have to fight myself. The government has given 
these rights to women; Indira Gandhi has started the mahila 
raj of women. Before her, there were no women’s rights. In 
case governments change ‘our’ rights then we have to fight 
the government. After all, it is ‘us’ who make the 
government’.29 
 
  
As opposed to a predominantly statist/legalist notion of citizenship 
articulated above, a more ‘active’ view of citizenship is very well 
enunciated in my fieldwork among the political and field workers of 
the MKSS. This active view of citizenship rights contains fluent 
expressions of an activist oriented view of citizenship replete with 
notions of self governance, accountability and responsibility that 
define ‘active’ citizenship. The MKSS or the ‘Association for 
Workers and Farmers’ has been involved in a long drawn struggle 
for the right of ordinary people to gain access to state financial 
records and state audits of development projects and has 
spearheaded a social movement espousing the right of public 
information and of the people’s right to know about the 
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government’s economic functioning. The right to information (RTI) 
movement began in the early 1990s to highlight the gross failures 
of the state to uphold minimum wage legislation particularly within 
drought relief programmes set up in order to provide stipulated 
employment to people in drought affected districts and to focus on 
the flagrant inefficiencies and corrupt practices within the state 
public distribution system (PDS). However, the activities of the 
MKSS have not been limited to exposing the everyday forms of 
official corruption and focusing on procedures of governmental 
accountability but have also come to expose the  ‘multifaceted 
nature of corruption’ within the legal and political system ( Goetz 
and Jenkins 1999) . In their decade long movement, the MKSS 
have championed innovative social techniques of mobilisation and 
public appraisal. Perhaps, the most innovative feature of MKSS’s 
campaign for RTI has been the introduction of participatory social 
audits of public expenditure or ‘jan sunwais’. Typically, a ‘jan 
sunwai’ consists of the submission of individual and collective 
testimonies about corrupt official practices for instance of fake 
muster rolls, corrupt state officials including state affiliates such as 
ration shop owners and elected local government representatives, 
at a pre-designated public space to which the concerned state 
officials/political representatives are invited to present their 
defence or give an account of their practices.  
 
The interview below presents an ‘active’ view of citizenship and is 
excerpted from a lengthy conversation with two prominent 
members of the MKSS. According to them:   
 
“..The road is built with our money. It is ‘our’ money because 
we pay income tax and we pay also tax on whatever we buy 
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such as rice, dal and cooking oil.  That is how the sarkar (the 
state/government) builds hospitals and schools. It builds these 
with ‘our’ money. The money that people used to think was 
sarkari or the building that was deemed to be sarkari, we tell 
the people it is not sarkari but it is ‘our’ building and it is ‘our’ 
money. ‘Our’ democracy must be safeguarded for that will 
make our rights safe. ‘Our’ effort should be that the 
constitution continues to guarantee the rights of citizens.30” 
 
At the outset, these two views of citizenship appear to invoke 
ideas associated with liberal citizenship (subjects of rights and 
entitlements) and of self-governance, rights and public service – 
ideas associated with civic republicanism.  But of course, that 
would be a very quick conclusion. For liberal citizenship is based 
on a contractual arrangement between individuals and the state on 
the basis of negative liberty and civic republicanisms’ valorisation 
of civic of political participation is conceptualised within and 
requires homogenous political communities. Neither liberal rights 
and selfhood nor homogenous political communities inform the 
justificatory premise of Haq as citizenship.  Even when citizenship 
is considered explicitly based on a common identity, the practice of 
rights has brought this homogeneity under considerable strain.31  
 
Furthermore, there is something peculiar about these narratives 
which predicate Haq on citizenship and require some unpacking: 
Many of these narratives whether they rest their justificatory 
premise of rights on law or the state or on the constitutional rights 
and obligations of citizens, retain with the people in the final 
instance, the right to change both the law/government or the 
constitution if it fails to uphold the rights of citizens. In other words, 
although the justificatory premise of rights in both is placed in 
law/constitution and in citizen prerogatives, in both cases, there is 
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a clear enunciation that somehow although law/constitution is 
required to justify these rights, Haq has an independent 
justificatory premise separate from the prevailing legal regime. Haq 
thus can said to lie in a “zone of non coincidence between 
individuals and the positive legal order of the state” (Brett 2003: 
98). Therefore, whereas the law regulates rights and upholds 
these, it cannot extirpate these. The reference to Haq is to an 
entity which exists independent of the law and possibly has a 
moral authority of its own. 
 
Cosmological/ancestral justification of Haq 
The third notion of Haq is embedded in the idea of the ‘ancestral’ 
and the ‘historical’ and also in some senses, the cosmological. It is 
quite different from the idea of contemporary idea of citizenship 
rights as state derived and of rights premised on the ancient 
identity of the citizen. This ancestral idea of rights is articulated by 
the indigenous peoples’ activists who are part of a large umbrella 
movement for rights to forest land claimed as ancient and sacred,  
which in Southern Rajasthan is known as the Jungle Zameen Jan 
Andolan ( JIZA).  The ancestral or cosmological notion of rights is 
not unique to the adivasis of Southern Rajasthan. Aboriginal 
communities in India and other parts of the world have very well 
developed systems of cosmic tales and traditions detailing their 
originating myths and status.32 The anthropologist Verrier Elwin 
writing about the Baigas of Central India refers to their originating 
tale which specifies their origination from “the womb of Mother 
Earth before the foundation of the world and to be the Bhumia 
Raja, veritable lords of the earth” (1937: 13).   
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The Jungle Zameen Jan Andolan (JIZA) came into existence in 
1995 and now covers seven southern districts of Rajasthan33. It 
was formed as a response to the forcible evictions of Rajasthan’s 
aboriginal communities from their lands and traditional homes 
deep within the forests. The colonial history of forest 
dispossessions is more than a century old.34while the history of 
dispossession and eviction of aboriginal peoples from their land in 
postcolonial Rajasthan dates back the passage of the Rajasthan 
Forest Act of 1953.  The 1953 act converted tribal forest rights into 
‘concessions’ and the aboriginal dwellers were expected to show 
proof or documentary evidence in support of their land or dwelling 
rights over the forest land. In the absence of correct procedural 
documentation, the land belonging to the adivasis was suddenly 
transferred to the state forest department and they became known 
in official speak as ‘tribal tillers’ and thereby ‘encroachers’ upon 
forest land.36 Over the years, the state government has sought to 
address the conditions of ‘tribal tillers’ by ensuing notifications in 
1978 and 1991 to regularise forest land possession, but these 
governmental circulars were not publicised among the beneficiary 
populations and even less implemented. In 2002, the arbitrary 
evictions of the aboriginal forest communities and other non-tribal 
forest dwellers from their homes and lands were carried out at 
scale ‘unprecedented in recent history’ (Campaign for Survival and 
Dignity, 2003). In the ensuing months, the forest department, in 
addition to employing brute violence, resorted to innovative 
coercive techniques including using elephants to drive people out 
of their villages and homes. 
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There are several locally based organisations affiliated to the JIZA 
which mobilise people around issues of rights over forest land and 
produce and against eviction. One of these local groups is Kotara 
Adivasi vikas manch ( Kotara Aboriginal Development Group)  In 
addition to the common problems affecting forest communities in 
Udaipur and elsewhere, Kotara Adivasi Vikas Manch is specifically 
concerned by the declaration of a wildlife sanctuary ‘Phulwari Ki 
Naal’ which has come to encompass forty villages in the area. In 
the interview below, one of my interviewees Harmi Bai is 
describing the aboriginal peoples’ resistance to the declaration of 
the ‘Phulwari ki Naal’ sanctuary and the difficulties that has posed 
for the aboriginal population of the area. Harmi Bai belongs to the 
Bhil tribe and is the secretary of the Adivasi Vikas Manch, Kotara. 
According to her:  
 
Earlier, we used to take the produce openly from the jungles 
and without any restriction and then suddenly, we were told 
that there was a prohibition on the forest produce as this was 
now a sanctuary for wild animals.  We were told that we could 
not build homes or rear our animals or sow the field inside the 
jungle. We were told that this was now protected land and a 
sanctuary and that they were now going to develop a park 
inside it and that tourists were going to come from abroad to 
visit the sanctuary. …. 
We continue to take the produce from the forests. We only 
take what we need. We are the owners of this jungle and the 
lands therein; we have a Haq over these. Wherever there are 
adivasis there are jungles, in the cities there are no jungles. 
We have protected the jungles. The Haq over these forests 
and water comes from our ancestors. These are our sacred 
lands- our ancestral spirits reside here- we have ancestral 
rights over these lands. Our forefathers have used this land 
for centuries. We tell the state forest officials, you do your job 
and stay here and that together we can stop the jungle mafia- 
who go into the jungles in their lorries illegally and for 
commercial purposes. But you cannot stop us from taking the 
produce for our own use from these jungles or force us off our 
land. 
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The displaced forest dwellers campaign has been very successful 
in influencing policy makers resulting in the passage of legislation 
on a bill of rights of forest tribes or the ‘Scheduled Tribes and other 
Traditional Forest Dwellers (recognition of Forest Rights) Act in 
October 2006’37. While much political mileage has been extracted 
from the legislative passage of this bill38, in reality however, there 
were other difficult political considerations which made the 
settlement of land titles to forest land a politically pressing matter. 
The passage of the forest department order of 2002 requiring the 
removal of ‘encroachments’ from forest lands has resulted in 
violent evictions of India’s forest communities (Bhatia 2005), which 
led to further displacement of forest communities who in many 
instances moved to occupy forest lands because they were 
displaced from their original habitation owing to land acquisition for 
various development projects (Shah 2005, Krishnaswamy 2005). 
The arbitrary and unsympathetic displacement of communities has 
led to simmering social unrest and political protests which are 
proving to be fertile grounds filling both the ranks of Maoist inspired 
extremism known as Naxalism in the forested districts within 
several Indian states and for Hindu fundamentalist organisations 
(Aiyar 2003). The political message was thereby loud and clear: 
the status quo over displaced and dispossessed forest 
communities was no longer politically viable.  
 
A Moral Basis for Haq 
The fourth conception of Haq is found in the moral encounter of a 
group of women workers known as the sathins39 within a state 
sponsored development programme for women in Rajasthan 
known as the Women’s Development Programme or the WDP. 
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The sathins are mostly semi literate or illiterate and are mainly low 
caste.40 
 
The WDP was launched the Government of Rajasthan in April 
1984 as a response to the failure of various development 
programmes to involve or to benefit women though the 
development interventions of the State.41 While there existed 
several development programmes with a female component in it, 
it was conceded by the State development bureaucracy that 
these had little or no effect on improving the inclusion and the 
participation of women within development.42 The development 
index for women in Rajasthan in the 1980s made a dismal read. 
The sex ratio was as low as 830 in rural areas of Bharatpur 
district and the overall sex ratio in the rural areas of the State was 
919. The female literacy rate in Rajasthan for rural women was 
5.46 (it was 4.03 percent in 1971 and registered only a percent 
increase in the last ten years and a 0.1 percent annual increase) 
and in urban areas. 
 
The WDP drew on a variegated set of development ideas. It 
incorporated ideas espoused by the internationalist women’s 
development frameworks, feminist conceptual frames and the 
development goals set by the Indian State in its sixth five-year 
plan. The development programme conceived its principal role 
and activities in consultative exercises with women’s 
development experts, activists, researchers, and non-government 
organisations, an exercise that resulted in the adoption of a 
development ethos markedly different than the ‘top down’, ‘skill 
disbursement’ nature of common development programmes of 
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the time. This departure from other development programmes 
was reflected in its new focus. It shifted its emphasis away from 
the ‘mechanisms’ delivering benefits to the recipients of 
development policies, to the subjects of development, i.e. to 
women. This development mantra embodied in the WDP was one 
of women’s ‘self-development’ and ‘self-empowerment’. Women 
were addressed as subjects of development policy rather than as 
incidental beneficiaries of development policies aimed at 
households and children. A ‘novel’ alliance was forged between 
the State and non-government actors, which in turn led to the 
creation of new administrative structures within the WDP to 
accommodate and articulate the concerns of the women’s 
researchers, activists and non-governmental organisations. This 
partnership fostered in its wake a new and direct relationship 
between development policies and women and established a 
linkage between rural and urban women with the latter taking on 
responsibility of training of the primary workers of the programme 
or the sathins. In a unique collaborative institutional arrangement, 
the State government of Rajasthan involved prominent feminist 
activists and NGOs within this development initiative. Both the 
partners within the programme agreed that their chief energies 
would be channeled through the sathin who would be subject to 
specific training regimes in order to be transformed into a suitable 
‘agent of development’.43 Over the years however, the 
programme has undergone changes in its orientation. In its early 
years, the programme enjoyed relative independence from the 
State development bureaucracy, which lent it considerable 
flexibility in its development activity. In the last decade however, 
the programme has seen a radical shift in its operational strategy 
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and ideological outlook. It has become closely tied to the 
development activities of the State and is now mostly used to 
strengthen the ‘delivery mechanisms’ of the development State. 
 
The originary and initial subject of the sathin emerged in two 
different discourse formulations, each based on different 
intellectual, historical and political trajectories. The first was a 
development vision authored by the state and the goal of its 
development script was unambiguous: to alter the existing 
subjectivities of the women elected as sathins in ways that would 
make them efficient and committed development workers. The 
second development vision was mediated by the feminist 
organisations who in collaboration  with the state   ‘trained’ the 
sathins through feminist consciousness raising methods, helping 
thereby, to  create  a sathin subject not only conscious of her 
subject positioning within existing social hierarchies of power 
relations but also one who was provisioned  with an alternative 
normative blueprint with which to challenge the oppressive subject 
forming and regulating power relations. It is therefore, in the ‘in 
between spaces’ (Bhabha 1999) resulting from the forging of these 
diverse development visions that the sathins negotiated elements 
of their subject formation. And it is through the performance and 
interation of their development tasks that they were forced to 
confront and enter into complex engagements with their received 
development scripts resulting in the novel articulations through 
which sathins re-script, re-inscribe and challenge the emancipatory 
limits set by the dual-authored script of the WDP.  
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Let me briefly describe the process through which the sathins 
acquire and identify with the moral language of rights. The process 
has within it both a linguistic as well as a moral dimension. The 
moral process comprises a dynamic ethical reflection, which 
occurs when they come in contact with rights based ideas. This 
leads to attempts to not only rethink many of the moral rules 
informing their own moral frameworks, but also selectively absorb 
many of these ‘new’ ideas in ways, which do not clutter their 
existing moral priorities and commitments.  
 
The linguistic exercise takes place when the moral ideas 
encountered and those selected need justification in a language, 
which is both acceptable and comprehensible. In other words, 
when the conceptual language of rights comes in contact with the 
natural language of Haq (Hindi/ Rajasthani/Urdu in this case) it 
results in a considerable amount of linguistic dislocation and 
turmoil. Here, I am not only referring to the problem of translation 
and linguistic correspondence but to the problem of moral 
justification of ideas in language. This moral justification involves 
using a conceptual term of high moral ranking within the vernacular 
for the new moral idea we want to introduce within our moral 
repertoire. 
 
An examination of the narratives of the sathins revealed a process 
bearing three clear stages in their thinking on rights over twenty 
years of participation within the WDP (women’s development 
program). Only two of the ninety sathins interviewed, identified 
clear sources other than the state as their first point of contact with 
the discourse of rights44. The initial contact with rights based ideas 
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produced in its wake moral dissonance and led to these being 
received by the sathins with considerable suspicion. The moral 
dissonance produced in turn gave way in time to a ‘new-found 
faith’ in the discourse of rights as upheld by the state. The thinking 
of rights in the second stage is then marked by the legitimation of 
the rights discourse in a language that is state dependent. The 
final strain (present stage) in their rights thinking occurs when they 
weave their own theoretical and practical defence of the idea of 
rights independent of the state. The state no longer is used to 
legitimise the upholding of women’s rights. Their new vocabulary 
rests its intellectual defence of rights on the notion of ‘truth’. Thus, 
women’s rights now come to be justified in the name of truth. But 
truth in their discourse is an expansive and complex term, the 
multiple connotations of which require some exposition. In the 
ordinary social science writing, truth is a cognitive concept, which 
is invoked in order to establish the ‘falsifiability’ or ‘verifiability’ of a 
claim. However, in the discourse of the sathins, truth is an 
expansive term and is non cognitive by nature, including within it 
ideas of rightness and justice. 
 
The architecture of this conception of truth is both an intellectual as 
well as a practical one drawing upon certain ‘ideal’ and 
uncorrupted aspects of social life. ‘Truth’ as it appears in the 
discourse of the sathins is not only an ideal concept but is also a 
practical construct. While this idea of ‘Truth’ draws upon notions of 
purity and is upheld as a high moral value, it is also a constitutive 
element of social practice. There are three kinds of practices that 
come to be upheld as being the embodiments of truth. Morality in 
public life seen in terms of non-corrupt dealings while occupying 
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public office, the upholding of equal rights of women and the 
espousal of justice come to be identified as constituents of the 
truth as a practical construct. 
 
Haq as an Islamic Doctrine of Right Conduct         
The final notion of Haq derives its justification from Islamic heritage 
and is tied very strongly to the idea of ‘right conduct. In the 
interviews with Muslim respondents in India and Pakistan, the 
Islamic heritage of Haq was strongly stressed.  The following 
excerpted interview with the Anjman Mazarein peasants is 
indicative of this understanding of Haq as an Islamic idea within 
popular Islamic imagination: 
 
“This word comes from Islam because Islam clearly marks 
out a very clear definition of the practices and conduct that 
constitutive of right behaviour.  Islam invokes Haq in two 
separate ways: a) as Haqooq ul Allah which is to do with 
right conduct in the discharge of religious obligations such as 
offering prayers five times a day, fasting during Ramzan and 
fulfilling all those religious that make me a good Muslim and 
b) Haqooq – ul- abad which relates to right conduct in 
respect of other human beings including towards my 
government and my family…… 
The right to cultivate and possess ownership is prescribed in 
the Holy Qur’an. For instance, in the Qur’an on paragraph 3, 
it says very clearly “if some one who cultivated the land for 
five years, he then becomes the owner of the land”. 
Therefore, the Mazarein have a right over the land which is 
justified by Islam itself”. 
 
In this particular narrative, I’m less interested in questions of 
‘purity’ or the faithful recalling of the Qu’ranic passage and more in 
the nature of the manoeuvre  of  marshalling Qu’ranic text in 
service of the struggle on hand.  In drawing attention to this 
particular text, I am not suggesting  that this is a definitive version 
of Islamic Haq but only that it is a notion of Haq which traces its 
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normative underpinnings to Islamic texts and to mystical Islam. 45 It 
is indeed correct that within Islamic scholarly heritage, the notion of 
Haq is often evoked as right conduct. Within Islamic texts for 
instance, Haq or Haqq is referred to as ‘right things’ and contrasted 
with batil or wrong things. “Haq is the doing of right things like the 
acts of obedience, the doing of which God has not forbidden” and 
batil or ‘wrong things’ is “associated with injustice, Kufr, and the 
acts of disobedience. Both are equally God’s creation. But the one 
is right and the other is wrong” (Izutsu 1965: 221). This 
interpretation of something being morally right and or ‘morally 
straight’ is quite distinct from having a right over something or 
possessing something. The ‘morally right’ sense of rights finds 
clear elucidation within early western political philosophical texts. 
In the history of western political concepts there has been an 
intense speculation as to when rights as we know today came to 
acquire their possessive meaning as opposed to their earlier 
meaning which evoked ‘moral rectitude’.  Very quickly, I want to 
add here that Haq as  ‘right conduct’ must not be viewed as a 
gender neutral term nor should its intellectual justification invoking 
Islamic heritage be regarded as ‘non political’. The promising rise 
of feminist interpretations of Islamic heritage and religious texts 
have pointed to the appropriation of Islamic history as a ‘political 
weapon’ in the hands of the Muslim ‘male elite’ (Mernissi, 1991), 
and now various feminist scholars have sought to reinterpret and 
reconstruct Islamic jurisprudence and historiography with a view to 
‘appropriate the right to transmit and resignify knowledge’ 
(Ouedghiri 2002), including rights of women within Islam.  
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Conclusion: 
Haq is almost always referred to as a masculine term, many 
female respondents simply told me that Haq belonged to a male 
vocabulary and that women almost never used the term amongst 
themselves.  It was often contrasted from adhikaar which was 
almost always invoked as a legal right  whereas ‘Haq’ was 
something which belonged to one and that would be justified in 
‘snatching back’ if taken away. Furthermore, there was an urban –
rural divide as well as an educational divide where the usage of 
Haq was concerned. So, for instance, it was mostly people in rural 
areas who used Haq to speak of their entitlements, urban 
educated men used the literal term adhikaar.   
 
Although, there are some apparent similarities between the usage 
of Haq and liberal rights, the justificatory premises of Haq inform 
certain different understandings of Haq say from the standard 
meanings accorded to rights and citizenship within mainstream 
liberal theory. As opposed to an individual as the possessor of 
rights, Haq also belongs to both individuals and groups.  Haq does 
not signify only negative rights of individuals: i.e. to be free from 
interference from others but also includes within it a positive notion 
of rights such as the provisions required to live a life of dignity. 
Despite its widespread legalists/statist connotations within the 
narratives, it was evident that its legalism was not clear cut but lay 
in the realm of a ‘zone of non coincidence’ in relation to the 
prevailing law. Notions of Haq are very close to what has been 
referred to  ‘new citizenship’ in Latin America as it includes legal  
and social citizenship claims and a moral/normative tone, whereby, 
it is not only important to strive for a democratic polity  but for the 
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establishment of a democratic society. This ‘new citizenship’ 
demands not only inclusion into the political community but also 
challenges exclusion and inequality (Rodriguez 2001). 
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1
 Acknowledgements: I’m grateful to Aasim Sajjad Akhtar and Asha Amirali for 
their  generous help with the  research on the Anjaman Mazarein. I also 
acknowledge gratefully the field assistance provided by Nazish Zahoor and 
Azmat Bashir in Pakistan. A draft of this working paper was read at the LSE 
Gender Institute  Reading Group and I thank the group members and Wendy 
Sigle-Rushton for comments and suggestions towards improving the text.  
Engin F. Isin encouraged me to sustain and develop my thinking on  
vernacular rights cultures  and I thank him for his support.  I extend a special 
thanks to Shail Mayaram for her careful, incisive and sympathetic reading of 
the text. 
 
2
 See the excellent discussion by Engin Isin (2002)  on the dangers of 
orientalism within  comparative frames in ‘Citizenship without Orientalism’ 
 
3
 I am grateful to Engin F. Isin for clarifying this argument ( personal 
communication, 2008). 
 
4
 See for example, the invention of conceptual hybrids such as ‘justice-rights ( 
or rightful justice),   rights-duties  and ‘communal self-governance’. I am 
grateful to Shail Mayaram for pointing these out to me (personal 
communication 2009).   
 
5
 The right to food is also included in the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural  Rights. 
 
6
 While there are several examples of political movements in South Asia that 
actually challenge the normative  and empirical descriptions embodied by the 
nation-state, these are very different in nature from the rights mobilisations 
under study here. Moreover, the rights that they deploy is the right to self 
determination (UNHDR which article?) rather than rights of social and political 
citizenship that are articulated here. 
 
7
  Economically, neo-liberalism implies economic restructuring and roll back of 
the welfarist provisions of the state including a cutback in its public service 
provisioning in favour of private actors while its political language privileges 
human subjects as principally homo economicus and defends ever greater 
marketisation of state functions including public policy formulations in favour 
of producing entrepreneurial subjects and citizenship entitlements (Brown 
2003, Rose 1996, Cruikshank 1999). 
 
8
 According to official records, the number of Hindi speakers in Rajasthan 
make up 89.56%. The Hindus make up 89.08% of the population and the 
Muslims (who are traditionally associated with the Urdu  language)  8.01%. 
Urdu is mainly spoken in the districts of Tonk, Nagaur, Kota and Sikar. 
Source: District Census Handbook 1991. 
 
9
 It is a pre-Islamic Arabic word which is also available in Hebrew, Persian and 
in some of the older Semitic languages such as Aramic, Phenician, Mendian. 
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10
 This is to point to the late dictionary appearance of the term.  
 
11
 The fieldwork was conducted in in six districts of Rajasthan between 1998-
2005  Jaipur, Barmer, Ajmer, Udaipur, Jodhpur and Chittorgarh. 
 
12 Consider for instance, the case of Manohari Bai, a member of ‘Marudhar 
Ganga Society’, a local NGO  working for dalit rights based in Jodhpur district, 
who stood up during the gram sabha and  demanded the right to know what 
was happening to the proposal to build a school for girls in her ward. She was 
mercilessly beaten by the Sarpanch ( who is a Choudhury and his supporters)  
and her clothes torn off her.  Manohar iDevi describes the incident in the 
following interview: 
 
It was in 2002, sometime in August –September that I went to the   gram 
sabha meeting and queried after an approved proposal to build a girl’s 
school.  The Sarpanch responded by saying .‘chup ho ja, tu kaun hain bolni 
wali’ (shut up for who are you to pose these questions’)?  Then suddenly all 
violence broke loose. I was beaten up and my dupatta (veil) and other 
clothes were torn off me whilst all the time, the people kept shouting ‘randi 
baith ja’ ( sit down you whore) . My attackers were mainly upper caste men 
but there was also a Patwari- a state official- who joined in. The Police 
refused to register a complaint against my attackers..5 Field Interview with 
Maohari Devi, Baodi Village, Panchayat Samiti Osian, Jodphur District, 2005. 
 
13
 http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_IND.html 
 accessed 31 March 2008 
 
14
 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International 
Development Association and International Finance Corporation Country 
strategy For India 
September 15,2004; p. 5; 
http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2
004/09/20/000160016_20040920102445/Rendered/PDF/293740REV.pdf 
accessed 29 March 2008 
 
15
 http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_IND.html 
accessed 31 March 2008 
 
16
 In 1981-91 the number of female workers increased by 79 per cent, three 
times that of men in the same category” and while “male literacy rose from 
54.99 per cent to 76.46 per cent and female literacy increased from 20.44 per 
cent to 44.34 per cent” between 1991-2001, at the same time, literacy levels, 
especially for girls, continue to be among the lowest in the country; health 
indicators are among the poorest in the country. The total fertility rate was as 
high as 3.73 in 1998-99, recording a decline of only 4.8 percentage points 
between 1989-91 and 1994-96, whereas nationally it declined by 7.6 
percentage points; expectation of life in the State is among the lowest (in 
1991-95 it was 59.1 years; 58.3 for men and 59.4 for women) in the country 
(at all-India in 1991-95 it was 60.3 years; 59.7 for men and 60.9 for women).  
ibid.; Selected MDG Indicators for India’s States, Annex 6 
 
  45 
                                                                                                                                            
17
 The Act extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir. [S.(12)] 
 
18
 In its judgement on ‘Vishakha and others vs the State of Rajasthan and 
others’, delivered on 13.8.1997, the Supreme Court expanded the meaning of 
‘Fundamental Rights’ and held that gender equality included protection from 
sexual harassment at work and the right to work with dignity (All India 
Reporter 1997, SC 3011).   
 
19
 BIMARU is an acronym combining the four northern Indian states of Bihar, 
Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. However, it also reads as the 
Hindi word ‘Bimar’ or sick. It therefore is often invoked to highlight the image 
of the chronically sick states in Northern India.  
 
20
 The non -coincidence of high political activity of women with their low social 
worth is often commented upon and contrasted with the ‘Kerala Model’ with its 
high socio-economic demographic indicators and low incidence of women’s 
participation within political decision making. For an explication of some 
reasons for this see Monica Erwer ‘Challenging the Gender Paradox: 
Women’s Collective Agency in the Transformation of Kerala Politics’, PhD 
dissertation, Goteborg University, 2003.  
 
21
 Akmal Hussain, Pakistan National Human Development Report 2003, 
Poverty, Growth and Governance, UNDP. www.unorg.pk/nhdr. 
 
22
 The terms of agreement between the landlords and the peasant farmers are 
outlined in the ‘Punjab Tenancy Act’ of 1887.  
 
23
  (2004) ‘Soiled Hands:  The Pakistan Army’s repression of the  Punjab 
Farmer’s Movement. Human Rights Watch.  
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/11997/section/11. Accessed 11 November 2009. 
 
24
 It emerged that the Pakistani Military which had at the time of gaining 
independence in 1947 seen the lands transferred from the British Military to 
them, had in effect, paid no rent to the Punjab Revenue Department which 
was the lessee of the land and hence, as a result of reneging on its 
contractual agreement with the Revenue department had very little legal 
authority to administer these agricultural farms. 
 
25
  Wesley Hohfield (1919, 2001)  and Joel Feinberg  (1970).  
 
26
 ‘Citizenship rights’ are a recent conceptual innovation. Historians of ideas 
have shown us that both the development of the idea of the citizen and that of 
individual rights had different intellectual histories. While the idea of the citizen 
owes its origins to the Greco Roman idea of the self-governing individual, he 
did not bear rights upon his person in the way that we normally understand 
rights to mean (Brett 2003).  The rights bearing individual came into being in 
the 16th century and it took another two centuries before the amalgamation of 
citizenship with rights of individual men occurred. The modern idea of 
citizenship therefore contains within it two ideas: the self governance 
(republican idea/Greco Roman idea) and a liberal ideal of citizens as subject 
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of rights and entitlements which mainly comes from Locke and Hobbes 
(Benhabib 2005, kastorayano 2005) and it was only later with Rousseau and 
with Kant who connected citizenship to the theory of consent that that 
citizenship gained its modern philosophical foundations (Walzer 1989). The 
ancient idea of citizenship comes in two versions: the Aristotelian idea of 
citizenship is linked firmly to the duty to hold public office while the Roman 
idea of citizenship accorded legal rights and entitlements all citizens within the 
Roman empire. The latter or the  ‘passive’ notion of citizenship is echoed in 
the early modern period with Bodin in the 16th century Jurist articulating 
citizenship as ‘enjoyment’ of liberty and property (Walzer 1989) and the firm 
establishment of the citizen as not an ‘authority’ and a ‘lawmaker’ but 
someone to whom legal protection is provided by the authorities. This 
commitment to protection writes Walzer, ‘rules out arbitrary use of political 
power; hence it makes for the kind of liberty sometimes called “negative”- the 
liberty of private life and power” (Walzer 1989:215). With perhaps, the 
exception of the Jacobin radical politics in the aftermath of the French 
revolution, the ‘active’ version of citizenship has been relegated to the realms 
of an aspirant ideal and it is passive citizenship that we have come to regard 
as the hallmark of modern liberal democratic political systems. T H Marshall is 
often credited with the more recent elucidation of the passive idea of 
citizenship and to the general revival of contemporary interest in citizenship 
thinking.   
 
Marshall (1973)  organised rights into three ‘bundles’; ‘civil, political and 
economic and plotted their modern development as an uneven process with 
civil rights emerging in the 18th c, followed by political rights in the 19th and 
social and economic rights were revived and established in the 20th century. 
Today, however, discourses around citizenship particularly in the more 
developed liberal democracies have moved from theorising rights of legal 
citizens to extending rights entitlements to non citizens, to thinking about 
inclusion of various kinds of identities within and the accompanying issues of 
culture, equality, authenticity, group rights ,nationality and extraterritorial 
status or what Heisler (2005) has termed ‘post-modern citizenship’…which is 
principally about “questions about who we are and who we ought to strive to 
be” (Heisler 2005). The purpose of this brief survey on citizenship was to 
isolate the two distinct meanings of citizenship: an active version which is to 
do with self governance, responsibility, obligations and public service and a 
‘passive’ view of citizenship which is linked principally to one’s legal status 
and negative rights. The two rights narratives that follow illustrate these two 
disaggregated views of citizenship (legal/liberal and republican) and ground 
their justificatory premise in these. 
 
28
 Interview with Sunny Sebastian, Rajasthan correspondent for the  ‘ The 
Hindu’, February 2004, Jaipur.  
 
29
 Interviewed in 2004, Kotkhawada, Phagi Panchayat, Jaipur. This is an 
extract from a longer interview with Prem Bairwa. 
 
30
 Interview with Tej Singh and Narayan, Rajsamand, 2004. 
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31
 Consider for example, an excerpt from the following interview with peasant 
farmers working at Okara farms, Pakistan: 
 
‘They wanted to take away our land, which did not suit us. We demanded 
our right but what did we get in return, the whole world has come to know 
about it, we got bullets, batons, and torture. In Pakistan, a Muslim is doing 
this to a Muslim, is it fair? If it is fair to treat your citizens like this then what 
India is doing to the Kashmiris  (in Indian Kashmir) is also fair. We should 
fight for our right; the brave Kashmiris are also sacrificing their lives for 
their rights, so shall we. Our forefathers were slaves to the Military, 
whatever the Military said they obeyed…. now we have learned to make 
independent decisions and are exercising our rights… We live in a Muslim 
country but our government is not ruling according to Islam. If it were, then 
no one would have felt the need to even ask for his right. Interviews with 
Naimat Ali and Rizwana Rashid, Okara Farms, Punjab Province , 
Pakistan, 2008. 
 
32
 Consider for instance, Australian  aboriginal myths of the Dreamtime before 
creation. 
 
33
 The districts covered by this movement are: Udaipur, Rajsamand, 
Dungarpur, Bansvara, Pali, Sirohi, and Chittorgarh.  
 
34
 See Ramachandra Guha, (1989) The Unquiet Woods: Ecological change 
and peasant resistance in the Himalaya, University of California Press, 
Berkeley. 
 
36
 Over the years, the state government has sought to address the conditions 
of ‘tribal tillers’ by ensuing notifications in 1978 and 1991 to regularise forest 
land possession which was cultivated prior to 1971 and 1980. But these 
governmental circulars were not publicised among the beneficiary populations 
and even less implemented. The statistics are shocking. For instance, instead 
of the of the 40,000 people who would have benefited from such a 
regularisation of cultivable forest land prior to 1980, the forest department 
identified only 11 persons who were eligible for these regularised lands!  
 
37
 The tribal rights bill when passed in 2006, guaranteed 13 rights including 
access to and ownership of minor forest produce for livelihood purposes, 
grazing rights, legal entitlements to the land that the adivasis may have been 
cultivating since or prior to October 25, 1980, right to conversion of forest 
villages into revenue villages. The bill suffers from at least three major 
weaknesses, these are: the bill’s provisions only apply to the Scheduled 
Tribes who live in the forest areas or are dependent on forest produce and 
ignores the other marginalized communities who live in the forest. Secondly 
the bill only extends to the forest areas under habitation prior to 1980 and 
finally, it imposes a land ceiling of 2.5 acres on the area claimed per 
household . These provisions, the bill’s critics argue does not take into 
account the large scale displacement of tribal populations as a result of 
‘development’ policies after the cut off period of 1980. Also, by fixing a land 
ceiling of 2.5 acres on forest lands and on tribal populations which is much 
lower than those in place for non ST populations and non forest lands, the bill 
clearly discriminates against the tribal populations who already own less land 
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and are more impoverished than non tribal populations. For a fuller critique of 
the bill see Krishnaswamy (2005). 
 
38
 The passage of the Tribal Bill 2006 has been heralded by many (Congress 
politicians mainly) as evidence of the sincerity of the present national 
government’s or the UPA’s ( this includes the main political party The 
Congress ( I) and  14 other regional and national level political parties)  
commitment to its Common Minimum Programme For example, they point out 
to the text of their agreed  Common Minimum Programme 2004 which reads: 
‘Eviction of tribal communities and other forest-dwelling communities from 
forest areas will be discontinued. Cooperation of these communities will be 
sought for protecting forests and for undertaking social afforestation. The 
rights of tribal communities over mineral resources, water sources etc. as laid 
down by the law will be safeguarded.  
 
39
 The word sathin literally translates as female companion/friend. 
40
 The fieldwork was conducted in the two districts of Rajasthan: Jaipur and 
Ajmer between September 1998-April 1999 and between January – March 
2004. 
 
41
 The Women’s Development Project Rajasthan, DRDPR, GOR, 1984. 
Henceforth, a reference to this document will be  (WDP, DRDPR, 1984). See 
also Prashasnik Prativedan avam Pragati Vivaran (The Annual reports of the 
department of Women, Child Development and Nutrition, (GOR) 1995-1999, 
(Hindi). 
 
42
 In 1984, there did exist several programmes on women’s development in 
the State. These programmes included: functional literacy for adult women 
under the ICDS programme, special nutrition programme, women’s 
polytechnics, the industries departments programme of 1000 household 
industries and the various schemes of the department/board for social welfare 
(WDP, DRDPR, GOR 1984:18). 
 
43
 The state including its feminist partners in the WDP harboured a shared 
assumption that the sathin would by virtue of her ‘empowerment training’ 
somehow be able to extricate herself from the prevailing power relations and 
gendered hierarchies and transcend her subordinate social positioning in 
order to achieve development goals of the WDP. Questions of the sheer 
precariousness and the personal insecurity that such a working role would 
involve were shifted onto the sathin herself and it was often pointed that it was 
the sathin who would create solidarity for herself through the creation of 
women’s groups in the village which would be her insurance policy against 
overt aggression. Both the state and its feminist development partner upheld a 
transgressive politics for the fulfilment of development goals without too much 
soul searching on the personal costs of this trangression. In fact, when the 
injuries resulting out of such a  transgressive politics became clear, the 
response by both the main actors (the state and the feminist groups) was the 
scaling back of the program both in terms of its institutional depth and training 
element thereby leaving the individual agent even more vulnerable. For more 
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on the instrumentalisation of women’s agency within development see 
Madhok and Rai ‘Agency, Injury and Transgressive Politics in Neoliberal 
Times’ ( forthcoming). 
 
44
 There were two exceptions to the state being the first point of contact with 
the idea of rights although they are in an indirect way. One of them was a 
daughter of a former Military man and the second sathin is married to a 
‘malaria Inspector’. It is important to note that both these men were and are 
employees of the state. 
 
45
  See Annemarie Schimmel (1975). I am  grateful to Shail Mayaram and 
Pnina Werbner for drawing my attention to the invocations of  ‘Haq’ within 
mystical Islam (personal communication, Sheffield 2007)  
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